My Attempts at LGBT Advocacy & Research: A Brief Retrospective

Over the years, I have been asked occasionally about the origins of my interest in advocacy and research related to LGBT issues since it seems so different than my work on classical Greek rhetoric.  This question has reemerged given my public presentations in recent years on a topic I call "The Transgender Exigency"--which is also the title to a forthcoming book.

To tell this story I need to go back to my high school days. Without question, most influential part of my high school and college education was my experience as a competitive debater, reinforced by my work as a debate coach in graduate school and my first job. Debate taught me how to think critically, research topics thoroughly, and to organize and present my thoughts persuasively. It taught me a love of clear, well-constructed, smartly argued, and well-researched arguments, and a genuine distain for bad ones. It also ignited a life-long interest in how we understand and argue about definitions.

I also credit my involvement with debate for an early introduction into feminism. Surrounded by smart, capable young women on the debate team and, I should add, as part of the writing staff of our high school newspaper, it frankly never occurred to me not to be a feminist, even if I had a fledgling understanding of feminism at the time.  Of course discrimination based on sex (as we defined it at the time) was wrong, and of course the Equal Rights Amendment (passed by Congress during my senior year) should be passed and of course Title IX made sense (it was implemented the summer after I graduated from high school).

I was a graduate student at Northwestern when Phil Wander's essay, "The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism," was published in the 1980s and I was convinced that scholars could and should do politically meaningful work. I did not always follow that path, as my doctoral dissertation was about Protagoras and the origins of Greek rhetorical theory. My first foray into explicitly political scholarship was "The Rhetoric of Nukespeak" (1989), which was a critique of nuclear language as advanced by the Reagan administration.  

By fall 1990, I was an assistant professor at Purdue University and my primary research program still focused on classical rhetoric and philosophy. I was involved with the women's studies program at Purdue, and taught about feminist theory and methods in my classes, but had yet to publish a work that I would call explicitly feminist.

Purdue is in West Lafayette, and it is next to Lafayette, where I happened to live in the fall of 1992. A member of the Lafayette City Council had a son who came out as gay, and that city council member made a motion that, as part of the City's updating its Human Rights Ordinance, they include sexual orientation as a category to be protected against discrimination.

As straightforward and sensible as the idea seems now, it was quite controversial at the time. The Supreme Court had ruled in Bowers v. Hardwick a few years earlier that the government could criminalize "homosexual sodomy" (though Indiana did not), and the succession of Supreme Court victories for gay rights were still on the horizon. The United States was soon to move from being a nation in which homosexual acts could be criminalized to one in which homosexuals could not be singled out as a group by discriminatory laws (Romer v. Evans 1996), could not be prosecuted for homosexual conduct (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, overturning Bowers), to having a constitutionally protected right to marry (Obergefell v. Hodges 2015), and be protected from job discrimination (Bostock v. Clayton County 2020).

But we were not there yet, and there was a great deal of opposition to the proposed amendment. Much of that opposition was fueled by what I thought were profoundly bad arguments. "Bad" in the sense of there being no evidence to support them (such as the claim that gay people were often pedophiles) or were weak justification for public policy (such as the claim that the Bible condemns homosexuality), or were constitutionally problematic (such as the assumption that religious grounds alone could justify a secular law). Reading such arguments in the local newspaper genuinely bugged me, so my partner and I attended a city council meeting in which the proposed amendment (now being called a gay rights ordinance) was going to be discussed. I was annoyed by the bad arguments being made against the ordinance, and so I got in line and took my turn speaking to the council to say just that.

That is how we ended up getting involved and playing a modest role in getting the ordinance passed. My efforts involved a combination of applied research and direct advocacy. I was first author of a white paper shared with members of the Lafayette and West Lafayette City Councils that drew on scholarly research to debunk myths about homosexuality, and I coauthored a guest editorial in the local paper. I led a team of faculty and graduate students to do a random-sample survey of area residents on the gay rights ordinance to compare to the lop-sided (nonrandom) results of a phone-in poll conducted by the local newspaper (Staff Report 1992). I spoke at City Council meetings and various panel discussions on and off campus.  

Later, when Purdue was considering whether to add “sexual orientation” as a protected category against discrimination and opponents expressed concerns about legal liability, I did a survey of all Big Ten universities to report on their experiences, which provided counter-evidence about the legitimacy of those concerns. 

I am fully aware that my efforts were quite modest in the larger scheme of things. I was a weekend warrior (activist-scholar) at best. I was experiencing significant career success thanks to my work in contemporary and classical rhetorical theory, and my classical work in particular can be credited for earning me tenure, various scholarly awards, and, a few years later, promotion to Professor in 1999. 

Meanwhile, my interest and research into definitional disputes generated a series of articles that culminated in a book in 2003, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning. Though that book was concerned primarily with making a series of theoretical interventions to advance what I called a pragmatic approach to definitions, my personal values and interests--that is, my political leanings--were increasingly apparent in my discussion of the case studies of definitional disputes involving "rape," "wetlands," and "person" (in the context of Roe v. Wade). 

Though the political implications of my work became more pronounced in the 2000s, prior to that time I was content with a status as full-time ally, but part-time activist- or politically-engaged scholar. I rationalized this in part because I became increasingly involved in administration--first as a Director of Graduate Studies (Purdue & Minnesota) and later as a Department Chair/Head (Minnesota & MIT) and it became difficult to pursue new research projects. I would also say that, as most senior scholars would agree, it is easier to write an invited book chapter or essay in an area where your work is already known and respected than to make a significant mid-career pivot. 

A career pivot is what I tried to do in the early 2000s, again motivated in part by what I considered to be bad arguments. The TV show "Will & Grace" was breaking ground with two leading characters who were gay men, but I was reading scholarly articles talking about how the show was "really" promoting heteronormativity. I wasn't buying those arguments and felt those scholars were missing an important contribution the show was playing in changing perceptions and attitudes, and my colleagues Peter B. Gregg and Dean E. Hewes set out to explore the issue through a series of empirical audience studies.

The result was a theory we called the Parasocial Contact Hypothesis, and our work was the first to establish empirically that positive media representations of sexual minorities can reduce prejudice among viewers (2005, 2006, 2008). Our work was embraced by organizations like GLAAD and used by subsequent scholars researching a wide variety of minority groups' representation, including several who work on transgender media representation. It is now regularly included in various academic and industry discussions of Social Impact Entertainment. I immodestly note that in 2016, Peter, Dean, and I were honored by the National Communication Association with the Woolbert Award for the Parasocial Contact Hypothesis as it "has stood the test of time and has become a stimulus for new conceptualizations of communication phenomena."

I returned to my study of argumentation to analyze competing definitional arguments about same-sex marriage in public and legal arguments in six different states (2012a, 2012b). I concluded my case study analysis with the admonition that such debates provided an important opportunity for argument scholars to educate our students and the public about the marked difference between constitutional and political/religious arguments, and to teach those who would listen about the potent power of visual persuasion. I tried to practice what I preached in various media interviews and public forums.

I stepped down as Department Head at MIT in 2019 and felt it was time to add the "T" to three decades of intermittent research and advocacy on LGB issues. Over the next two years I worked on a new project that brings together my long-time interest in definitions and the political work of categories with an ongoing commitment to social justice. The resultant book is titled The Transgender Exigency: Defining Sex/Gender in the 21st Century. I hope to write more about the book in future blog but what I can say here is that it has been a team effort: Throughout the writing of the book I have read and consulted with many trans people, including scholars, activists, and artists. And the book would not have been possible without the assistance of a diverse group of student research assistants from Wellesley College and MIT. 

It has been 6 years since my last blog post. I promise the next one will come far sooner!

Stuff I've Said about Classical Greek Philosophy & Rhetoric

2015 marks the 25th anniversary of three articles of mine dealing with the origins of Greek rhetorical theory (1990abc).  I hope to publish an article later this year talking about the production and reception of those 1990 articles, but in the meantime, I thought it might be useful to interested readers to summarize the arguments I have been trying to make over the years, divided into their major categories. Thanks for reading!

Constructive Claims about Protagoras

·       The historical significance of Protagoras’s fragments is clearest when read as advancements of Heraclitean insights and responses to Eleatic philosophy (2003).

·       P’s “there are two logoi about every thing” fragment is not simply a claim that we can argue about anything, but an extension of Heraclitean philosophy that represents an advancement from compositional toward what we would now call attributional analysis (2003, 89-100).

·       P’s “weaker/stronger” logoi fragment is not an amoral description of rhetoric but as advocating the strengthening of a preferred but temporarily weaker logos to challenge a less preferable but temporarily stronger logos of the same experience (2003, 103-14).

·       P’s Human-Measure fragment is best appreciated historically as a humanist response to Parmenides monism that implies an early expression of what we now call a frame of reference and “objective relativism” (2003, 117-30).

·       P’s “impossible to contradict” fragment can be understood as anticipating Aristotle’s law of noncontradiction, and resonates with P’s other fragments about objects’ qualities and frames of reference (2003, 134-39).

·       P’s particular uses of the Greek verb “to be” (einai) is highly unusual for his time as the word was a key object of analysis of those we now call philosophers.  His use of the term, especially in the human-measure fragment and a passage “concerning the gods” was distinctive and provocative (2003).

·       P’s “concerning the gods” fragment is an early expression of secular humanism that may have opened a lost treatise about humans, perhaps as described by Plato in P’s “Great Speech” in the dialogue Protagoras (2003, 141-48).

·       P may have advanced an analogy that became common in classical Greece between speech and medicine: Logos is to the mind/soul as medicine is to the body (2003, 166-68).

·       As others have noted, P provided the first theoretical rationale for participatory democracy, describing logos as the best means by which the polis deliberates and makes decisions (2003, 175-87).

·       Protagoras was not refuted and rejected by Plato and Aristotle as much as his ideas were assimilated into their thinking about what we now call epistemology and metaphysics (2003, 190-94).

Constructive Claims about Gorgias

·       G’s distinctive style played an important transitional role in promoting and advancing performance-prose composition in early Greek literature.  Descriptions of his prose as “poetic” refer to his word choice rather than his prose meter or rhythm (1999, 85-113).

·       G’s Helen may have inaugurated the prose genre of the encomion; G advanced 5^th century “rationalism” by enacting innovations in prose composition; identifying Helen as “epideictic” or a veiled defense of Rhetoric is problematic; and Helen’s most significant theoretical contribution was to provide a secular account of the workings of logos—an account that functioned as an exemplar for later theorists (1999, 114-32).

·       G’s On Not Being (ONB) has been misunderstood at times by trying to classify it as Rhetoric or Philosophy at a time when the categories were fluid.  ONB was a response to Eleatic tracts about “Being” by Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno that functioned both as entertainment and serious philosophy (133-47).

·       A formalization of G’s ONB suggests that if viewed in isolation, G’s argument is unpersuasive and invalid, but if the intertextual linkages with Parmenides are noted, G’s argument gains both rhetorical and philosophical strength (148-52).

Constructive Claims About 4^th Century BCE Theory

·       The earliest surviving uses of the word rhêtorikê are from the early 4^th century, and the term may have been coined by Plato.  Plato also coined Greek words for the verbal arts of dialectic, eristic, and antilogic (1999, 2003). 

·       Isocrates never used the word rhêtorikê in his writings, instead describing his education as philosophia and logôn paideia, a fact that problematizes accounts that position him championing Rhetoric over Philosophy (1999, 166-80).

·       Isocrates can be read as a forerunner to contemporary pragmatism, both in his emphasis on practical philosophy and connecting pedagogy with civism (1999, 180-84).

·       Isocratean philosophia can be understood as the cultivation of practical wisdom through the production of ethical civic discourse (2010, 43-66).

·       Aristotle’s theoretical account of Epideictic rhetoric is original and redescribes a set of disparate rhetorical practices (speeches of praise, festival orations, and funeral orations).  His formulation arguably subsumed and subverted these ideological significant categories of speech making (1999, 185-206).

·       Dialegesthai (holding dialogue) can be appreciated as a sophistic term of art. Plato’s coining of dialektikê was part of an on-going effort in his work to “discipline” dialegesthai into his philosophical theory & pedagogy (2010, 17-41).

·       Unlike such terms as rhêtorikê and dialektikê, the Greek words for Oratory (rhêtoreia) and “to orate” (rhêtoreuein) are rarely used in the 4^th century and were put to very little conceptual use (1999, 155-61).

·       Analysis of the terms used to describe public deliberation in Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle provide a useful window to their varying views on deliberation, democracy, and public discourse.  Dêmêgoria and symboulê, in particular, are the terms Aristotle employs to provide his rehabilitation of public deliberation (2010, 67-113).

·       The so-called Rhetoric to Alexander does not use the word rhêtorikê, thus providing an interesting text of the 4^th century outside of the Platonic/Aristotelian tradition. Arguably the text has affinities with what George A. Kennedy has described as philosophical, sophistic, and technical traditions, as well as an early treatise on argumentation (2010, 115-36).

Deconstructive Claims: 

·       The Standard Account is Flawed on Each of the Following Points (1999).

1.  The Art of Rhetoric originates with Corax of Sicily around 467 BCE.

2.  Corax was probably the teacher of Tisias, a fellow Sicilian.

3.  Corax and/or Tisias authored the first technê, or book designated as an Art of Rhetoric.

4.  Corax/Tisias may have been the first to define rhetoric, specifically as the “artificer of persuasion.”

5.  An important contribution of Corax/Tisias’ handbook was the identification of the parts of forensic speeches.

6.  The primary theoretical contribution was their identification of the “argument from probability.”

7.  By the end of the 5^th century CE, written technical handbooks were commonly available to which people could turn to learn rhetoric.

8.  Most early teaching of the Art of Rhetoric, including that of Corax/Tisias, concentrated on forensic rhetoric.

9.   At least some of the handbooks included discussion of style.

10. No 5^th century BCE rhetorical handbook exists now because Aristotle’s writings made them obsolete.

11. Though specific doctrines may have varied, there was a commonly identified group of individuals in the 5^th century known as the Sophists: Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Critias, & Antiphon.

12. The most important shared characteristic of the Sophists was that they all taught an Art of Rhetoric.

13. The rhetorical teaching of the Sophists was amoral.

14. The Sophists were relativists who eschewed any positive notion of “truth” in favor of subjectivism.

15. The Sophists were more concerned with teaching political success than pursuing “truth,” per se.

16. Plato’s philosophical rhetorical theory was formulated primarily in response to 5^th century rhetorical theory.

17. Plato’s philosophical rhetorical theory can be distinguished from Sophistic rhetorical theory by its commitment to truth—even when truth conflicts with political success.

·       Contrary to some historical accounts, a standard division of speeches into prooemium, prosthesis, diegesis, pistis, and epilogos cannot be documented prior to the 4^th century, nor can such terms be documented as terms of art in the 5^th century applied to speeches or prose discourse (2010, 137-70).  Poetic and epic compositional habits described as “ring composition” are likely better explanations for recurring prose patterns (1999, 105-10; 2010, 157-67).

·       George A. Kennedy’s categories of technical, sophistic, and technical rhetoric are problematic as descriptors of 5^th century texts relevant to the history of rhetorical theory (1999, 30-82).

Methodological/Theoretical Claims

·       A useful distinction can be made between Historical Reconstruction of historical texts and their Contemporary Appropriation for theoretical or pedagogical inspiration. Both activities are valuable and are judged by different criteria, with the avoidance of anachronism being definitive of historical reconstruction (1995; 2003, 64-85).

·       In historical reconstruction, it is sometimes more useful and interesting to see what a particular author does than what s/he means.  That is, sometimes the most important historical contribution of an author has to do with innovative vocabulary, syntax, or patterns of reasoning than the content of their texts, per se (1999, 2003, 2010).

·       The history of Greek rhetorical theory can be enhanced with study of emerging “terms of art” about persuasive speaking and argumentation (2010, 1-16).  To this end, a preference for our best approximation/reconstruction of the original words of past theorists is desirable, along with recognition that the dominant sources on the Older Sophists (Plato and Aristotle) must be used with the utmost care and concern for distortion (2003).

·       Historical reconstruction of 5^th century texts requires sensitivity to the transition between orality and literacy and the changing compositional practices taking place during that time (1999, 2003).

·       A useful distinction can be made between explicit theories of rhetoric and implicit or “undeclared” theories (2010, 139-141).

·       Though any act of translation requires the imposition of categories that might be unrecognizable to historical figures, care must be taken not to allow categories such as Philosophy and Rhetoric to overly limit our understand of texts created before those categories were established (1999, 2003, 2010).

·       What scholars find “rhetorically salient” in historical texts is guided by our beliefs, values, and interests (2003, 206-12; 2010, 130-36). 

·       Part of the experience of rhetorical salience is how we value similarity and difference.  Historical reconstruction tends to value what is different and unfamiliar about a historical text in order to understand different ways to experience and conceptualize the world, while contemporary appropriation tends to value points of similarity between historical texts and current needs and interests (1996; 2003, 64-69, 205-12).

·       Following Gadamer and Ricoeur, there is an analogy between engaging historical texts and ethical ways of engaging an Other. Though “pure” access to the past or Other is impossible, to treat Gorgias, Protagoras, Isocrates, etc., ethically and respectfully involves attending to their differences from us before we move to assimilating them into our categories (1999, 167-68).

·       One can be committed to antiessentialism and antifoundationalism and still be a historian.  One can and should acknowledge the contingency and constructedness of “facts” and interpretations, while still preserving the genre of writing known as history (1996; 1999, 56-65; 2003, 205-12).

Sources

1990a. “Did Plato Coin Rhêtorikê?”  American Journal of Philology 111: 460-73.

1990b. “History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism:  A Reply to Poulakos.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 23: 307-15.

1990c. “Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?” Philosophy and Rhetoric 23: 192-217.
1995. “Protagoras and the Language Game of History: A Response to Consigny,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 25: 220-23

1996. “Some of My Best Friends are Neosophists: A Reply to Consigny,” Rhetoric Review 14: 272-79. 

1999. The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece. New Haven: Yale UP.

2003. Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2d ed. Columbia: U. of South Carolina P. (first edition published in 1991).
2010. Classical Greek Rhetorical Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. (with David M. Timmerman)

Laughing At vs. Laughing With "Duck Dynasty"

Media scholars have known for a long time that the key to a popular show is to create the space for a wide variety of viewers to find enjoyment.  Nearly 40 years ago, a study by Neil Vidmar & Milton Rokeach* found that conservative viewers of the satirical All in the Family were laughing along with the racist/sexist/homophobic Archie Bunker while liberals were laughing at him.  The distinction is important and it may explain why Duck Dynasty is now in deep trouble.

Prior to the controversy stemming from DD's "patriarch" Phil Robertson's racist and anti-gay comments, the show could be (at least in theory) enjoyed by a wide variety of viewers.  Many viewers identified with one aspect of the show or another, while other viewers learned about a part of Americana that they may have known little about.  Narratives are driven by characters (the more interesting, the better) and through their words and actions, they affirm some values and challenge others.  Audiences watch programs for a wide variety of reasons, and a cleverly constructed program will make room for a very diverse audience to find pleasure in watching, whether it is to identify with central characters (and laugh or cry with them), or to feel superior to them and laugh at them.

The problem for DD now is that a significant part of their audience will find it difficult to continue to watch and take pleasure from watching someone they know to be so prejudiced (even if he doesn't quite realize it himself).  For those with a social conscience, Phil Robertson is no longer a harmless, sometimes even endearing hillbilly who reminds us a bit of Jed Clampett.  He is a genuine redneck, complete with prejudices and a level of ignorance that is pretty much the opposite of endearing.

There is no freedom of speech issue here.  It is simpler than that:  It is business.  While certain self-proclaimed Christians now claim to support Robertson's right to be prejudiced toward gays and lesbians and painfully ignorant of race relations, the bottom line is the bottom line, which is that A&E needs to rescue the program so that Americans who don't share Robertson's views can still find a way to enjoy the show.  That won't happen while Phil Robertson remains defiantly committed to view points that many viewers find backward and extreme.

*"Archie Bunker's Bigotry: A Study In Selective Perception And Exposure." Journal of Communication 1974 24(1): 36-47.

SCOTUS COWARDICE CONTINUES

Yesterday I suggested that the SCOTUS’s decisions in U.S. v. Windsor (which struck down a part of DOMA) and in Hollingsworth v. Perry (which denied standing to those challenging a lower court ruling that struck down California’s Prop 8) were “somewhat cowardly,” because the Court stopped short from stating unequivocally what almost every other recent court decision has declared:  There are no good reasons to prohibit same-sex marriage. 

Let me say that again:  Recent court decisions have stated repeatedly that there are no good reasons to prohibit same-sex marriage. 

What is especially significant about these decisions is the fact that the ‘no good reason’ conclusion has been the finding regardless of what level of scrutiny courts have used.  In the 2003 Goodridge decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court used the most conservative, deferential test available, the “rational basis” test, and found that none of the “reasons” to prohibit same-sex marriage could withstand scrutiny.  In 2008, the California Supreme Court used a much tougher test known as the “strict scrutiny” standard and, not surprisingly, also concluded the prohibition could not stand.  In Connecticut (2008) and Iowa (2009), the courts split the difference and used what is known as the “intermediate” standard of scrutiny, again concluding there were no reasons advanced on behalf of the prohibition of same-sex marriage (if interested, I provide a more detailed summary of these decisions here).

Similarly, the Court of Appeals that decided U.S. v. Windsor before the case went on to the SCOTUS used the intermediate scrutiny standard and concluded DOMA “does not withstand that review.”  U.S. District Court Judge Vaughn Walker, who issued the ruling striking down California’s Prop 8, concluded that Prop 8 is unconstitutional “because it denies a fundamental right [to marry] without a legitimate, much less compelling, reason” (p. 116), unable to pass even a “rational basis review” (p.117).

The reason for such unanimity is that the motivations behind those who oppose same-sex marriage are almost always religiously based, and a religious rationale is constitutionally unacceptable.  While there have been quibbles over other reasons, such as whether same-sex parents provide a good environment for children to be raised, these other reasons have been found consistently to be either irrelevant to the legal principles involved, or lacking compelling evidence to support them.  So, one more time with feeling, recent court decisions have stated repeatedly that there are no good reasons to prohibit same-sex marriage. 

Today, the SCOTUS denied cert to two cases involving same sex marriage: Brewer v. Diaz and Coalition for theProtection of Marriage v. Sevcik.  The second of these decisions is a direct challenge to the state of Nevada’s constitutional provision defining marriage as solely between a man and a woman.  In that decision, District Judge Robert C. Jones affirmed Nevada’s constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage based on the 1971 SCOTUS refusal to consider a challenge to the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Baker v.Nelson, denying a Minnesotan’s claim to a constitutional right to marry for same-sex couples.  Though in oral arguments this past March, SCOTUS justices scoffed at the relevance of this 40-year-old decision, it remains the controlling precedent until the Court overrules or otherwise replaces it. 

By refusing to hear these cases in their next term, the Court is interpreted as indicating they are not “ready” to take on the fundamental question of whether laws and state constitutions that forbid same-sex marriage are constitutional.  Such a conclusion has nothing to do with rationality, good reasons, or legal principles and everything to do with politics.  That is why I claim their cowardice continues.