Stuff I've Said about Classical Greek Philosophy & Rhetoric

2015 marks the 25th anniversary of three articles of mine dealing with the origins of Greek rhetorical theory (1990abc).  I hope to publish an article later this year talking about the production and reception of those 1990 articles, but in the meantime, I thought it might be useful to interested readers to summarize the arguments I have been trying to make over the years, divided into their major categories. Thanks for reading!

Constructive Claims about Protagoras

·       The historical significance of Protagoras’s fragments is clearest when read as advancements of Heraclitean insights and responses to Eleatic philosophy (2003).

·       P’s “there are two logoi about every thing” fragment is not simply a claim that we can argue about anything, but an extension of Heraclitean philosophy that represents an advancement from compositional toward what we would now call attributional analysis (2003, 89-100).

·       P’s “weaker/stronger” logoi fragment is not an amoral description of rhetoric but as advocating the strengthening of a preferred but temporarily weaker logos to challenge a less preferable but temporarily stronger logos of the same experience (2003, 103-14).

·       P’s Human-Measure fragment is best appreciated historically as a humanist response to Parmenides monism that implies an early expression of what we now call a frame of reference and “objective relativism” (2003, 117-30).

·       P’s “impossible to contradict” fragment can be understood as anticipating Aristotle’s law of noncontradiction, and resonates with P’s other fragments about objects’ qualities and frames of reference (2003, 134-39).

·       P’s particular uses of the Greek verb “to be” (einai) is highly unusual for his time as the word was a key object of analysis of those we now call philosophers.  His use of the term, especially in the human-measure fragment and a passage “concerning the gods” was distinctive and provocative (2003).

·       P’s “concerning the gods” fragment is an early expression of secular humanism that may have opened a lost treatise about humans, perhaps as described by Plato in P’s “Great Speech” in the dialogue Protagoras (2003, 141-48).

·       P may have advanced an analogy that became common in classical Greece between speech and medicine: Logos is to the mind/soul as medicine is to the body (2003, 166-68).

·       As others have noted, P provided the first theoretical rationale for participatory democracy, describing logos as the best means by which the polis deliberates and makes decisions (2003, 175-87).

·       Protagoras was not refuted and rejected by Plato and Aristotle as much as his ideas were assimilated into their thinking about what we now call epistemology and metaphysics (2003, 190-94).

Constructive Claims about Gorgias

·       G’s distinctive style played an important transitional role in promoting and advancing performance-prose composition in early Greek literature.  Descriptions of his prose as “poetic” refer to his word choice rather than his prose meter or rhythm (1999, 85-113).

·       G’s Helen may have inaugurated the prose genre of the encomion; G advanced 5^th century “rationalism” by enacting innovations in prose composition; identifying Helen as “epideictic” or a veiled defense of Rhetoric is problematic; and Helen’s most significant theoretical contribution was to provide a secular account of the workings of logos—an account that functioned as an exemplar for later theorists (1999, 114-32).

·       G’s On Not Being (ONB) has been misunderstood at times by trying to classify it as Rhetoric or Philosophy at a time when the categories were fluid.  ONB was a response to Eleatic tracts about “Being” by Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno that functioned both as entertainment and serious philosophy (133-47).

·       A formalization of G’s ONB suggests that if viewed in isolation, G’s argument is unpersuasive and invalid, but if the intertextual linkages with Parmenides are noted, G’s argument gains both rhetorical and philosophical strength (148-52).

Constructive Claims About 4^th Century BCE Theory

·       The earliest surviving uses of the word rhêtorikê are from the early 4^th century, and the term may have been coined by Plato.  Plato also coined Greek words for the verbal arts of dialectic, eristic, and antilogic (1999, 2003). 

·       Isocrates never used the word rhêtorikê in his writings, instead describing his education as philosophia and logôn paideia, a fact that problematizes accounts that position him championing Rhetoric over Philosophy (1999, 166-80).

·       Isocrates can be read as a forerunner to contemporary pragmatism, both in his emphasis on practical philosophy and connecting pedagogy with civism (1999, 180-84).

·       Isocratean philosophia can be understood as the cultivation of practical wisdom through the production of ethical civic discourse (2010, 43-66).

·       Aristotle’s theoretical account of Epideictic rhetoric is original and redescribes a set of disparate rhetorical practices (speeches of praise, festival orations, and funeral orations).  His formulation arguably subsumed and subverted these ideological significant categories of speech making (1999, 185-206).

·       Dialegesthai (holding dialogue) can be appreciated as a sophistic term of art. Plato’s coining of dialektikê was part of an on-going effort in his work to “discipline” dialegesthai into his philosophical theory & pedagogy (2010, 17-41).

·       Unlike such terms as rhêtorikê and dialektikê, the Greek words for Oratory (rhêtoreia) and “to orate” (rhêtoreuein) are rarely used in the 4^th century and were put to very little conceptual use (1999, 155-61).

·       Analysis of the terms used to describe public deliberation in Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle provide a useful window to their varying views on deliberation, democracy, and public discourse.  Dêmêgoria and symboulê, in particular, are the terms Aristotle employs to provide his rehabilitation of public deliberation (2010, 67-113).

·       The so-called Rhetoric to Alexander does not use the word rhêtorikê, thus providing an interesting text of the 4^th century outside of the Platonic/Aristotelian tradition. Arguably the text has affinities with what George A. Kennedy has described as philosophical, sophistic, and technical traditions, as well as an early treatise on argumentation (2010, 115-36).

Deconstructive Claims: 

·       The Standard Account is Flawed on Each of the Following Points (1999).

1.  The Art of Rhetoric originates with Corax of Sicily around 467 BCE.

2.  Corax was probably the teacher of Tisias, a fellow Sicilian.

3.  Corax and/or Tisias authored the first technê, or book designated as an Art of Rhetoric.

4.  Corax/Tisias may have been the first to define rhetoric, specifically as the “artificer of persuasion.”

5.  An important contribution of Corax/Tisias’ handbook was the identification of the parts of forensic speeches.

6.  The primary theoretical contribution was their identification of the “argument from probability.”

7.  By the end of the 5^th century CE, written technical handbooks were commonly available to which people could turn to learn rhetoric.

8.  Most early teaching of the Art of Rhetoric, including that of Corax/Tisias, concentrated on forensic rhetoric.

9.   At least some of the handbooks included discussion of style.

10. No 5^th century BCE rhetorical handbook exists now because Aristotle’s writings made them obsolete.

11. Though specific doctrines may have varied, there was a commonly identified group of individuals in the 5^th century known as the Sophists: Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Critias, & Antiphon.

12. The most important shared characteristic of the Sophists was that they all taught an Art of Rhetoric.

13. The rhetorical teaching of the Sophists was amoral.

14. The Sophists were relativists who eschewed any positive notion of “truth” in favor of subjectivism.

15. The Sophists were more concerned with teaching political success than pursuing “truth,” per se.

16. Plato’s philosophical rhetorical theory was formulated primarily in response to 5^th century rhetorical theory.

17. Plato’s philosophical rhetorical theory can be distinguished from Sophistic rhetorical theory by its commitment to truth—even when truth conflicts with political success.

·       Contrary to some historical accounts, a standard division of speeches into prooemium, prosthesis, diegesis, pistis, and epilogos cannot be documented prior to the 4^th century, nor can such terms be documented as terms of art in the 5^th century applied to speeches or prose discourse (2010, 137-70).  Poetic and epic compositional habits described as “ring composition” are likely better explanations for recurring prose patterns (1999, 105-10; 2010, 157-67).

·       George A. Kennedy’s categories of technical, sophistic, and technical rhetoric are problematic as descriptors of 5^th century texts relevant to the history of rhetorical theory (1999, 30-82).

Methodological/Theoretical Claims

·       A useful distinction can be made between Historical Reconstruction of historical texts and their Contemporary Appropriation for theoretical or pedagogical inspiration. Both activities are valuable and are judged by different criteria, with the avoidance of anachronism being definitive of historical reconstruction (1995; 2003, 64-85).

·       In historical reconstruction, it is sometimes more useful and interesting to see what a particular author does than what s/he means.  That is, sometimes the most important historical contribution of an author has to do with innovative vocabulary, syntax, or patterns of reasoning than the content of their texts, per se (1999, 2003, 2010).

·       The history of Greek rhetorical theory can be enhanced with study of emerging “terms of art” about persuasive speaking and argumentation (2010, 1-16).  To this end, a preference for our best approximation/reconstruction of the original words of past theorists is desirable, along with recognition that the dominant sources on the Older Sophists (Plato and Aristotle) must be used with the utmost care and concern for distortion (2003).

·       Historical reconstruction of 5^th century texts requires sensitivity to the transition between orality and literacy and the changing compositional practices taking place during that time (1999, 2003).

·       A useful distinction can be made between explicit theories of rhetoric and implicit or “undeclared” theories (2010, 139-141).

·       Though any act of translation requires the imposition of categories that might be unrecognizable to historical figures, care must be taken not to allow categories such as Philosophy and Rhetoric to overly limit our understand of texts created before those categories were established (1999, 2003, 2010).

·       What scholars find “rhetorically salient” in historical texts is guided by our beliefs, values, and interests (2003, 206-12; 2010, 130-36). 

·       Part of the experience of rhetorical salience is how we value similarity and difference.  Historical reconstruction tends to value what is different and unfamiliar about a historical text in order to understand different ways to experience and conceptualize the world, while contemporary appropriation tends to value points of similarity between historical texts and current needs and interests (1996; 2003, 64-69, 205-12).

·       Following Gadamer and Ricoeur, there is an analogy between engaging historical texts and ethical ways of engaging an Other. Though “pure” access to the past or Other is impossible, to treat Gorgias, Protagoras, Isocrates, etc., ethically and respectfully involves attending to their differences from us before we move to assimilating them into our categories (1999, 167-68).

·       One can be committed to antiessentialism and antifoundationalism and still be a historian.  One can and should acknowledge the contingency and constructedness of “facts” and interpretations, while still preserving the genre of writing known as history (1996; 1999, 56-65; 2003, 205-12).

Sources

1990a. “Did Plato Coin Rhêtorikê?”  American Journal of Philology 111: 460-73.

1990b. “History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism:  A Reply to Poulakos.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 23: 307-15.

1990c. “Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?” Philosophy and Rhetoric 23: 192-217.
1995. “Protagoras and the Language Game of History: A Response to Consigny,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 25: 220-23

1996. “Some of My Best Friends are Neosophists: A Reply to Consigny,” Rhetoric Review 14: 272-79. 

1999. The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece. New Haven: Yale UP.

2003. Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2d ed. Columbia: U. of South Carolina P. (first edition published in 1991).
2010. Classical Greek Rhetorical Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. (with David M. Timmerman)